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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: PART 56
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
JUDITH CLARK,

Index No. 160965/2017
Petitioner,
FOR A JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR ARTICLE 78

-against-

DECISION AND ORDER

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent.

HON. JOHN J. KELLEY

Petitioner Judith Clark's Article 78 petition challenging the denial of her application for
parole release by Respondent New York State Board of Parole ("Parole Board") is granted.
Ms. Clark is incarcerated due to a 1982 conviction based on her role as a driver in an
armed robbery of a Brinks armored truck in Rockland County that resulted in the death of three
people, two of whom were police officers. Considering herself a revolutionary in conflict with
the government, Ms. Clark represented herseif at triai and, in rejecting the court's authority,
mounted no real defense to the charges against her. Her participation at the trial was limited to
opening and closing statements and calling a single witness. She even failed to oppose the
district attorney's heightened sentence recommendation, thus paving the court's \vay to imposing
three consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences. In sentencing Ms. Clark, the court expressed the
view that, given her crimes and conduct during the trial, she was irredeemable.
By most accounts, however, Ms. Clark has undergone a remarkable transformation over
the three dec~des during which she has been incarcerated. Ms. Clark has taken responsibility for
her actions, expressed remorse, and tried to improve the lives of her fellow prisoners, as well as
many others. In December 2016, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo granted Ms. Clark clemency
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based on her "exceptional strides in self-development and improvement." In doing so, Governor
Cuomo commuted Ms. Clark's sentence by reducing its minimum term to 35 years, thus making
her eligible for parole for the first time in 2017.
On April 5 and April 6, 2017, Ms. Clark appeared before the Parole Board for an
interview that lasted approximately eight hours. The topics of discussion included all aspects of
Ms. Clark's case, such as her early life, her criminal history, the subject crime, her trial, her
sentencing, her institutional history, and her record of achievement and service since her
incarceration. On April 20, 2017, the Parole Board issued its decision denying Ms. Clark's
parole application. The Parole Board acknowledged, and did not depart from, Ms. Clark's
favorable risk assessment as documented by her achievements, good work, and expressions of
remorse for her actions; nonetheless, the Parole Board stated that it "reviewed boxes of public
support and boxes of opposition" and was "persuaded against release by opposing information
that includes statements from former and current officials, and statements from survivors and
affected parties found in pre-sentence records, sentencing minutes and other public records." In
this regard, the Parole Board stated:
"We do not depart from your favorable risk assessment; however, we do find that
your release at this time is incompatible with the welfare of society as expressed
directly by relevant officials and thousands of its members, and that it would
deprecate the seriousness of your crimes as to undermine respect for the law. You
are still a symbol of violent and terroristic crime. Perhaps the transcript of our
interview will allow parties, whose statements we must consider, to read about your
ongoing personal evaluation for the first time."
Although the Parole Board acknowledged that Governor Cuomo granted Ms. Clark clemency, it
seemed to give little weight to the Governor's commutation of her sentence in light of the Parole
Board's assertion that it considered substantial additional information that "was created and
submitted pursuant to [its] unique process."
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On December 11, 2017, Ms. Clark initiated this Article 78 proceeding, arguing that the
Parole Board's decision is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to established law. In opposition,
the Parole Board argues that it properly considered all the relevant factors that the Executive
Law requires.
The Executive Law enumerates eight statutory factors to determine whether an inmate
should be released on parole, five of which are relevant to this case:
"(i) the institutional record including program goals and accompiishrnents,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments,
therapy and interactions with staff and inmates; ... ; (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate ... ; (v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim
or the victim's representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or
physically incapacitated ... ; (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due
consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of
the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as weii as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii)
prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to
any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement"
(Executive Law§ 259-i [2] [c] [A]).
A parole board must consider all eight factors, but it need not give equal weight to each factor

(see Matter of King v NYS Div. ofParole, 190 AD2d 423, 431 [1st Dept 1993], a.ffd 83 NY2d
788 [1994]). In addition, a parole board is obligated to ensure that only the relevant guidelines
and factors are considered (id at 791 ).
Although a parole board must consider the seriousness of the crime, it must, nevertheless,
do so in conjunction with the other factors enumerated in the statute, and it must conduct a risk
assessment analysis to determine if an inmate has been rehabilitated and is ready for release (see
Executive Law§ 259-c [4]). The legislative intent behind the Executive Law is to base parole
board determinations on a forward-looking paradigm, rather than a backward-looking approach
that focuses on the severity of the crime (see Platten v NYS Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc 3d 1059, 1062
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[Sup Ct, Sullivan Cty. 2015]). Thus, a parole board may not deny parole based solely on the
seriousness of the offense (see Matter of Rossakis v NYS Bd. of Parole, 146 AD3d 22 [1st Dept
2016]; Matter of Ramirez v Evans, 118 AD3d 707 [2d Dept 2014]; Matter ofGelsomino v NYS

Bd of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2d Dept 2011]). Rather, a parole board must be guided by
risk and needs principles, and it must explain its reasons with particularity if it departs from a
risk-assessment analysis. (Division of Parole Regulations§ 8002.2 [a]). If the record indicates
that a parole board may have considered factors not permitted under the statute and related
regulations, the court must remand the matter for a new interview before a new parole board

(King, 83 NY2d at 791).
Ms. Clark asserts that the Parole Board (1) failed to abide by the statutory Executive Law
factors by focusing almost exclusively on the severity of her crime and her conduct during her
arrest and trial, and (2) improperly considered factors outside the scope of the statute and
applicable regulations when it considered, inter alia, penal philosophy, the imposition of life
sentences on those convicted of murder or felony murder, and the consequences to society if life
sentences are not imposed.
Under the unique factual circumstances presented here, this court finds that the Parole
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its determination of Ms. Clark's parole application.
For instance, instead of considering the views of the sentencing court, as is required by
Executive Law§ 259-i (2) (c) (A), the Parole Board impermissibly considered a letter from a
different jurist who sits in the Ninth Judicial District. The Parole Board treated this letter as if it
were from the sentencing court; however, this jurist did not preside over Ms. Clark's trial or
sentencing. Instead, this jurist was assigned by the administrative judge to provide the
"sentencing court's" view of Ms. Clark's parole eligibility because the sentencing judge retired

4
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in 2008. The letter, which relied on hearsay from the trial judge and other unknown sources,
strongly advocated against Ms. Clark's release:
"[t]o release this defendant now, after the decades of suffering by the families of
the victims, the verdict of a jury in a fair trial and the lawful, logical, appropriate
and just sentence by the trial judge, who was conversant with all the facts, would
make our judicial system the mockery that the defendant claimed it was all those
years ago. Is it now the standard that a defendant who expresses remorse after no
matter how many decades and no matter how heinous the crime, should then qualify
for release, even though the harm and suffering caused by her acts still exist?"
The Parole Board should not have considered this letter. The Executive Law's reference to the
sentencing court's recommendations means the recommendations of the judge who imposed the
original sentence, not a jurist who did not participate in the original trial or sentencing. In this
regard, although the sentencing judge may have retired, his opinion can be found in the same
sentencing minutes that the Parole Board referenced in its interview with Ms. Clark and in its
subsequent decision.
Moreover, in light of Governor Cuomo's grant of clemency, even the sentencing judge's
opinion, similar to other aggravating circumstances from decades ago, has very limited value.
The Governor's decision to exercise his constitutionai authority to grant clemency, by its nature,
removes the evaluation of Ms. Clark's original sentence from typical Executive Law
considerations. This is because the Governor, in granting clemency, determined that in the 35
years after Ms. Clark's sentencing, circumstances developed that rendered the original sentence
unduly harsh, such as her remorse and rehabilitation, which are things the sentencing judge could
not have foreseen when he imposed the original 75-years-to-life sentence. This is not to say that
commuting Ms. Clark's sentence minimizes the seriousness of her crimes, but it serves as a
strong counterweight to both the views of the sentencing court, as expressed over 35 years ago,
and the significance of the original sentence.
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Further, the Parole Board erroneously considered letters that it wholesale failed to
disclose to Ms. Clark in advance of her interview or subsequent administrative appeal. Subject
to certain specific exceptions, an inmate is entitled to all the information contained in his or her
parole case record (see Division of Parole Regulations§ 8000.5 [c] [1]). The Executive Law
provides that"[ w]hcre a crime victim or victim's representative ... or other person submits to the
parole board a written statement concerning the release of an inmate, the parole board shall keep
that individual's name and address confidential" (Executive Law§ 259-i [2] [c] [B]) (emphasis
added). Section 259-k of the Executive Law allows the Parole Board to make rules to maintain
the confidentiality of such records. Under this authority, Division of Parole Regulations (9
NYCRR) § 8000.5 (c) (2) (i) (a) (3) provides that access to case records can be restricted or
withheld only to the extent that the records contain "any information which if disclosed might
result in harm, physical or otherwise, to any person." Although the regulation provides a basis to
redact or withhold records that could potentially endanger someone, no evidence in the record
suggests that the Parole Board undertook any analysis to determine whether making appropriate
redactions and thereafter disclosing the substance of these letters to Ms. Clark would have
harmed anyone, let alone the community at large. 1 Without making such an analysis, it appears
that the Parole Board arbitrarily decided to withhold all the letters that were submitted by the
community. Doing so is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the Executive Law and its
regulations.

1

Even ifthe information that the Parole Board relied on could have been properly designated as confidential, the
Parole Board still was required by Division of Parole Regulations § 8000.5 to notify Ms. Clark of its intent to rely on
such information (see West v NYS Bd. ofParole, 4 I Misc 3d 1214[A] [Sup Ct, Albany Cty. 2013) (holding that
confidential information, even when properly protected by the law, "certainly should not trump the statutory
requirement that the [Parole] Board's decision reveal the factors and reasons it considered in reaching its decision,
particularly when such consideration is mandated by statute"); Matter ofA/manor v NYS Bd. of Parole, 16 Misc 3d
l 126[A] [Sup Ct, NY Cty. 2007) ("Even though, on some occasions, 9 NYCRR 8000.5 allows respondent to
consider materials ... protected from a parole applicant's review, respondent would not have the right to keep the
fact of their consideration secret from the applicant").
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As it stands, the Parole Board's decision provides few specifics about the details or
content of the letters. For example, the Parole Board indicated that it considered a strong letter
in opposition from a legislative body that sits more than 300 miles away from both the place of
the crime and the current location of Ms. Clark's incarceration. Such a letter, sent to the Parole
Board in what only can be presumed as being in an official capacity, should fall outside the
scope of reasonable community opposition; yet, the Parole Board read it into the record and
appeared to have given it serious weight, nonetheiess (see Appendix 168-169). Furthermore, at a
minimum, the Parole Board has not explained why the numerous letters of support from those
who personally know Ms. Clark are outweighed by the opposition letters submitted by the
community. The Parole Board must be careful not to be swayed by appeals that include
considerations outside the scope of the factors outlined in the Executive Law (see e.g. King, 83
NY2d at 791). Without the court knowing the substance of these letters, the Parole Board's own
words and stated reliance on letters from public officials and others opposed to Ms. Clark's
release strongly signals that the Parole Board considered factors that are impermissible under the
statute, such as penal philosophy. As a result, this court finds from this this record that the
Parole Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the petition is graJited to the extent of setting aside the determination by
the Parole Board denying Ms. Clark's parole; and it is further,
ORDERED that the matter is remitted to the respondent for a new interview before a new
panel of the Parole Board; and it is further,
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ORDERED that said interview must be conducted within 60 days of the date of this
court's decision and order, and the Parole Board is directed to issue a parole decision within 30
days of the date of that interview.
Dated: April 26, 2018
ENTER
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